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Chronic  inflation  has  been  the outstanding  feature  of the United
States  economy  for more than a decade. It is our foremost economic
ill  as  we  approach  the 1980s.  Inflation has decimated consumer pur-
chasing  power,  inhibited  business  investment,  and  weakened  our
export competitiveness.
Since  last December,  consumer  prices  have risen at an annual rate
of  131/2  percent,  a  sharp  acceleration  from  the  9  percent  of 1978,
and almost double the 1977 inflation rate.
Earlier  this  year,  a major element  in inflation  was the rise in food
prices.  Bad  weather  and  strikes  pushed  the food component  of the
Consumer  Price  Index  to  a  20  percent  annual  rate of increase.  But
increasingly  inflation has come from rising energy prices.
In January  and  February  of this year,  some  30 percent  of the in-
crease in consumer  prices resulted from the rise in food prices. Only
10  percent  was  attributable  to  increased  energy  costs.  By  May,
the proportions  were  exactly  reversed.  Since the beginning  of 1979,
energy  product  prices  at  retail  have  gone  up at about  a  40 percent
annual  rate.  This  is  more  than three  times faster than the rest of the
items in the Consumer Price Index.
This year's  inflation  has  stemmed in  large  degree  from  forces not
directly  related  to  current  levels  of demand,  but rather from those
forces  which were  unpredictable  and  over which  we  had little if any
control.
The Development  of Chronic Inflation
Let's  look  away  from  the  present  situation  to the  beginnings  of
our era of chronic  inflation.  Beginning  in the mid-sixties, that initial
episode  of inflation  fit the traditional definition of too much money
chasing  too  few  goods.  In  the  1966-68  period,  the  federal  budget
was  the engine  of inflation.  Employment,  production, capital spend-
ing  and  real  incomes  all  soared-but  so  did  prices.  In  the Vietnam
War  era the classic  textbook choice  of guns or butter was politicized
into guns and butter.
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For  the  years  1968  through  1978,  the  U.S.  inflation  rate averaged
just  over  6  percent; its lowest point was 4.1 percent in 1972. By way
of  contrast,  for  the  years  1952  through  1967,  inflation  averaged  2
percent and,  at its worst,  was 3.4  percent in  1957.  Thus, every year
since  1968  has  had  a higher  inflation  rate  than  any  year  between
1952 and 1967.
Rapid  inflation  became  a  chronic  disease  for  the  first  time  in
U.S. history.  Then,  in  1970, we  experienced  another  first: recession
with  continuing  inflation.  So  we  coined  a new term  to describe this
phenomenon-stagflation.
Throughout  this  entire  period  the  economics  profession  has not
acquitted  itself  well  at  all.  During  the  1960s  many  of the contem-
porary  "leaders"  of  our  profession  widely  applauded  the  "new
era"  where  a  choice  between  guns  and  butter  was  no  longer  re-
quired.  We  need  not  be  concerned  with  budget  deficits  and,  if the
national  public  debt  burgeoned  to heretofore  unthinkable  propor-
tions,  why  worry?  After  all,  it  is  only  a  debt  we  owe  ourselves.
Many  of the economics  profession,  because  of overriding social con-
science  and  for  other reasons,  completely  gave  themselves  over to
short-run  political  expedience.  The  age  of rent-an-economist  exper-
ienced its greatest growth.
As  a  result  of  political  expedience  reinforced  by  unsound  eco-
nomic  policy  advice  an  inflation  psychology  has  developed.  It  has
now become rooted in the American  public's mind.
Most of us readily  recognize  that the area of our economy which
matches  our  textbook  models  is  small  and  shrinking.  Much  of the
economic  arena  is  dominated  by  cost-oriented  prices  and  equity-
oriented  wages.  Most  prices  are  set  by  sellers  whose  primary  con-
cern  is  maintaining  customers  and market  share  over the long haul.
Pricing  policies,  relying  on  some  standard  measure  of costs,  are set
to  exceed  costs  by  a percentage  mark-up  that varies little  over the
business cycle.
Similarly,  the  key  to  wage  decisions  is,  generally,  the  common
long-run  interests  of  workers  and  employers  in  maintaining  job
relationships.  This  means,  among other  things,  long-term  wage  con-
tracts  with  automatic  cost-of-living  adjustments,  even  in periods  of
recession.  This trend  is  heightened  by other rigidities that have been
built  into  the  American  system-the  minimum  wage,  increased job
security, etc.
These  customer  and  career  relationships  that insulate  and  desen-
sitize  wages  and prices  from  the "correcting"  forces  of excess  short
run  supply  and  demand  have  genuine  social  function  and  value.
But  the  resulting  influence  on  wages  and  prices  has  two  effects.
When  total spending  begins  to expand  rapidly,  most of the increase
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added inflation.  On the other hand,  when the dollar growth of GNP
slows,  most  of  the decline  consists  of loss of production  with little
relief from inflation.  So  inflation  is slow starting, but, once in place,
is extremely difficult to curb.
As the American  public  has recognized  the pernicious  persistence
of  inflation,  they  have  changed  their  behavior  in  ways  that  have
made  inflation  even  more  rapid and tenacious.  Price  and  wage  deci-
sion  processes  have  been  adjusted  to  respond  promptly  to  infla-
tion:  wages  through  the  spread  of  escalator  clauses  in  the  major
collective  bargaining  contracts;  prices  through  business  adjustments
to  reflect the  growing  gap between  replacement  costs and historical
costs-raising  prices  at  shorter  intervals,  ceasing the practice  of tak-
ing fixed price orders, etc.
The "acceptable"  rate of inflation for policymaking has risen from
1.5  percent  in  the  early  60's  to  3  percent  in the early  70's. We  all
must  be  now  wondering  what  the  next  plateau  will  be.  Probably
every  candidate  elected  to  national  office  in  - at  least  - the  last
decade  has  promised  to  fight  inflation.  Americans  have  been  told
again  and  again  by  their  leaders  that  inflation  would  be  curbed.
Instead,  it  has  continued  to  increase.  Not  unexpectedly  then,
this  broken  promise  is  just  one  more-but  major-factor  in  the
growing  credibility  gap  between  citizens  and their elected  officials.
(There  is,  coincidentally,  just as  wide  a credibility  gap between  the
general public and economists.)
Is There A Remedy?
Is  the  chronic  disease  incurable,  or  is  there  a  remedy?  My  an-
swer  is:  yes,  inflation  can  be  brought  under  control  (in  fact  I  be-
lieve  it  must be)  but  it  can  be accomplished only gradually  and to
accomplish  it  will  require tremendous  willpower  on the part of the
American  people and our elected representatives.
The whole  psychology  of inflation  has developed  and become  en-
demic  over  the  past  decade.  To  be  overcome  and  reversed  a long-
time  period  is  necessary.  The danger  is that the willpower  won't be
sufficient.  Politically  powerful  groups-labor  and  business-would
have  to  experience  pain  to  overcome  inflation  (higher  unemploy-
ment and  declining  profit margins  may  be inevitable  and the line on
spending  must be held)  at a time  when we  are  going into  a national
election  year.  Will  statesmanship  prevail  over  political  survivorship?
It may be too much to ask.
What  tools  are  available  to  combat  inflation  if  we  can  find  the
will?  There  are a number of anti-inflationary  policies, including fiscal
policy,  monetary  policy,  and  wage  and  price  policies.  One  thing
these  policies have  in common:  there  is no  quick and  painless  cure.
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I  believe  the  correct  prescription  must  use  a  mix  of  all  of  the
above  policies  but my assignment  is  to discuss  the fiscal  policy  pre-
scriptions  so  I  will  concentrate  the rest  of my remarks  on that area.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal  policy-defined  with  respect  to  its role  in  price  stabiliza-
tion-involves  use  of  the  taxation  and  expenditure  powers  of  the
government to  effect the  level of economic activity. Its propositions
are fairly straightforward:
(1)  An  increase  in  government  expenditures  raises  the  gross  na-
tional product  (GNP).  The  amount of this increase  is determined
by the multiplier.
(2)  An  increase  in  taxes  reduces  the GNP.  The  amount  of decrease
depends  on the multiplier.  The tax multiplier,  however,  is always
1  less  than  the  expenditure  multiplier  (and,  of  course,  of the
opposite sign).
(3)  A  balanced  increase  in  the  level  of  a budget,  with both  expen-
ditures  and  taxes  rising  by  the  same  amount,  changes  the level
of  GNP,  normally  raising  it.  Thus  it  is  an  important  truth that
$1  of  taxes  does  not  neutralize  $1  of  expenditures.  So  a  bal-
anced  budget  at  a  higher  level  can  stimulate  economic  activity.
Fiscal  policy  measures  can  be  either  automatic  or discretionary.
Automatic  fiscal stabilizers are those which are built into our tax and
expenditure  programs.  As  GNP falls, incomes  and sales decline, auto-
matically  cutting  government  revenues.  The reduction  in  revenues
is  greater  than  the  decline  in  income  and  sales,  due  to  graduated
tax rates.  If  GNP  rises,  the  opposite effect  occurs. Tax receipts  are
greater  than  the  increase  in  GNP.  Some  categories  of expenditures,
particularly  unemployment  and  welfare  programs,  automatically
increase  in  response  to  a decline  in  GNP.  Thus  a  decline  in  GNP
pushes  the  budget  toward  deficit,  a  rise  in  GNP  pushes  it  toward
surplus.  As  a  rule  of thumb,  for  every  additional  billion  dollars  of
GNP,  the  federal  budget  gains  about  $300  million  of  additional
surplus or reduced deficit.
These  automatic  stabilizers  serve as our strongest insurance against
another  major  depression.  But  due  to  rigidities  which  have  been
built  into  our  system,  the  automatic  stabilizers  do  not  operate  as
effectively  against inflation.
The  level  of  economic  activity  can  also  be  influenced  by  dis-
cretionary  fiscal  policies,  such  as  new  taxes,  changes  in tax  rates
and  changes  in  levels  of  government  expenditure  and  programs.
Discretionary  stabilizers  change  the  relationship  between  the  gov-
ernment budget and levels of GNP.
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an indicator of its restrictive or stimulative effect, since this absolute
size  is a result of both movements  in the economy and of deliberate
fiscal  policy.  To separate  the two  effects  we  have invented  the con-
cept  of  the  full  employment  budget  (FEBS).  Usually  the  term
"full  employment  budget  surplus  (FEBS)"  is  used  for its  obvious
political  appeal.  There  is  no  particular  other  reason  for  a surplus
at full employment.
The  FEBS  concept,  then,  is  an  estimate  of  what  the  federal
budget  position  would  be if the  economy  were  operating at its full
potential.  To  relate  this  concept  to  the present  situation, the  Con-
gressional  Budget  Office  estimates  the  following  FEBS  position,
based  on  the fiscal  1979  budget  as  passed  by the  Congress last fall:
Fiscal Year  1977  1978  1979  1980
(Billions)
FEB Surplus (+)  or Deficit (-)  -10.3  -11.2  1.5  18.9
According  to these  estimates we are currently passing from a stim-
ulative  budget  phase  into  a  restrictive  phase  with  1979  essentially
impact neutral  if fiscal  policies  in effect at the beginning of this year
are  not  changed.  These  policies  include  (1)  the  increases  in  social
security  tax rates  in January  1979 and in the social security tax base
in both 1979 and 1980 as well as  (2) the income tax reductions made
by  the  Revenue  Act  of  1978,  effective  in  January  of  this  year.
Possibly,  then,  the  Administration  is  on  the  correct  course and its
policies should be supported and  given the chance to work.
To support the present  set of policies  will require,  on the part of
both  the  Congress  and  the American  people,  a restraint and  an  ele-
vating  of  the  public  good  above  private  self-interest not  evident in
recent  years.  There  is  already  considerable  clamor  in the Congress,
in the press, in powerful vested interest groups (both the "Chryslers"
and  the  labor  unions)  and  from  some  economists  for  measures  to
either  stimulate  the  economy  (anti-recessionary  measures  such  as
tax  cuts  and  increased  spending)  or  to  insulate  the economy  from
inflation through various indexation schemes.
A  Washington  Post  editorial  of  last  week  deplored  the idea that
recession  might  be viewed  as  a remedy for inflation.  "There emerges
a  certain  danger  that  many  Americans-including  those  in  high  of-
fice  who  make  economic  policy-will  come  to  think  of recessions,
not  as  failures,  but  as  remedies,"  read  the  editorial.  It went on to
point  out  the  severe  cost  in  suffering  exacted  by unemployment.
That  is one  of the major problems:  inflation exacts its severe costs
as  well  but they  are  more  hidden  and  affect  less organized  consti-
tuencies  and are  therefore  less  popular  to write about. The Adminis-
tration and the Democratic  Congressional  leadership  deserve applause
for  holding the line  so  far.  We  can  only  wonder  how long they  will
hold out.
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Most  public  finance  students  agree  that  fiscal  policy  can  effec-
tively  influence  the  level  of  economic  activity  toward  price  stabil-
ity.  There  is,  however,  considerable  debate  over  whether  stabiliza-
tion  policy  should  rely  on  automatic  stabilizers  alone  (Rule)  or
should  automatic  stabilizers  be  supplemented  by  discretionary
measures (Authority)?
Rule  advocates  reject  discretionary  measures  as  destabilizing
because  of  lags.  The  extreme  of  this  view  is  advanced  by  Milton
Friedman  who  advocates  a  completely  automatic  monetary  mech-
anism for achieving price stability.
Authority  proponents  contend  that  automatic  stabilizers  alone
cannot  do the job, or at least operate  too slowly.  As  (1)  our under-
standing  of  macroeconomic  relationships  and  (2)  our  ability  to
forecast  trends improves,  it is foolish  (according to this view) not to
rely  more  heavily  on  discretionary  policy  when-and  where-in-
dicated.
Discretionary  fiscal  policy  measures  include  variation  in the level
of  public  spending  and  changes  in both tax rates and tax structure.
It  is true,  as the rule advocates  charge,  that all  are  subject  to inevit-
able lags.
These  lags  are  perhaps  the greatest  obstacle to the effective  use of
discretionary  fiscal  policies.  First  there  is  the  recognition  lag,  the
several  months that pass  before  the "experts" and analysts can agree
that  inflation  exists.  (Obviously  we've  passed this  point).  The  deci-
sion  lag  follows,  the  months  during  which  the  President  and  his
advisers  decide  what  to  do,  the  period  of  consideration  by  the
Congress  and  the  additional  months  before  the  program  or  tax
changes actually become effective.
Finally  there  is  the  effectiveness  lag,  the  period  before  the  full
economic  impact of the measure takes place.  A fiscal policy measure
may never be  effective  if it is viewed  as a temporary measure by the
public  and  its  impact  can  be  avoided.  The  income  tax  surcharge
passed  by the Johnson  administration  in  1968 was never  effective in
dampening  excess demand  at that time.  The  primary reason  for this
lack  of  effectiveness  was  that  the  tax  was  widely  publicized  as  a
temporary  measure.  The  taxpayers  believed  their  government,  paid
the  tax  surcharge  out  of  savings  or  borrowings,  and  continued  to
spend at high levels.
One  solution  to the inescapable  problem  of lags would  be to rely
upon automatic  stabilizers  plus what is termed "formula flexibility."
Formula  flexibility  would  index  fiscal  policy  changes  to  some  re-
liable-and  current-indicator  of  economic  activity.  Changes  in
GNP,  inventory  levels,  level  of  total  investment  or the  consumer
price  index are possibilities.
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time  it  takes  firms  to hire  or lay-off workers.  The idea here  is that
changes  in  key  indicators  would  automatically  trigger  a prescribed
fiscal policy  change,  e.g.,  tax rates would rise in inflationary  periods.
Distributional Impacts
All  of us are  concerned  over the distribution  of the pain of fight-
ing  inflation.  As  a  restraint  on  private  spending  Paul  Samuelson
recently  proposed  a  "modest"  increase  in  taxes  on  incomes  over
$30,000  which  "would  avoid  the  dangerous  and discriminating  un-
certainties  of  monetary  policy  as  well  as  the  effect  of budget cuts
on the poor."  Professor  Samuelson indicated  that this action  would
affect  fewer than  5  million  taxpayers  while  bringing  a  measure  of
restraint to  bear on recipients  of between  1/4 and  1/5 of all taxable
income.
Pointing out that the Administration had warned Congress against
tampering  with increases  in Social Security taxes (which fall heaviest
on incomes  below  $30,000)  because of the need to limit demand, he
felt  that President  Carter could  hardly  refuse to accept  a similar  in-
crease for the same purpose on top incomes.
On  the  other  hand,  the  President  had  proposed  to  cut  back  on
Comprehensive  Employment  and  Training  Act  (CETA)  Programs,
hold  down  federal  employee  pay  increases  to  5.5  percent,  reduce
federal  payments  to  medicare  and  medicaid  recipients  and  reduce
federal  payments  to the total  Land-Grant  university  system-exten-
sion, high  education  and experiment stations (what was our response
to this one?).
More  recently  Congressman  Al  Ullman  and Senator  Russell  Long
have  proposed  a  value-added  tax (VAT)  to shift the distribution  of
tax  burdens  in  somewhat  the same  direction  as Samuelson  has  pro-
posed.  At a minimum the proposed  VAT  would replace  the payroll
tax increases  scheduled  for a big jump in 1981. Payroll Tax increases
would impact the greatest  on low and mid-income  salaried  workers.
They  would be replaced  by VAT  as  a tax on  all consumption  (food
might be exempted to lessen the impact on the poor).
The  VAT  proposal  might  also be extended  to replace  the corpo-
rate  income tax.  The corporate income tax is probably borne mainly
by  consumers  although  the  evidence  is  not  conclusive.  The  VAT
would be totally passed on to consumers.
I  have  mentioned  these proposals  as current,  viable  discretionary
fiscal policy  proposals  primarily because I know you will have strong
feelings  about some  or all of their features.  They are not intended as
a  comprehensive  listing  of  current  proposals  nor  do  I  necessarily
endorse  any  of  them  as  the fiscal  policy  presciption  for  our infla-
tion problems.  However, they illustrate  the primary  point  I  want to
21make.  Do  you  believe  inflation  is  a  serious  enough  problem  that
you are willing to hurt for a while to overcome it?
Summary
Chronic  inflation  did  not  become  endemic  in  U.S.  society  over-
night.  It  grew  out of the mistaken  belief that,  in the beginning,  we
could  have  our  guns  without  giving  up  our  butter  and,  more  re-
cently,  that  mortgaging  future  generations  is preferable  to suffering
short-run pains of recession.
We have  become  a "fast  (temporary) relief"  society  and there are
clearly  no such  answers  to our inflation  problems.  An  inflation psy-
chology  and  major  structural  changes  have  come  about in the U.S.
society.  These  must  be  overcome  if  we  are  to  do  anything  about
chronic  inflation.  They  will  require  time to overcome,  and  will not
be  overcome  without  strong  leadership  and  a  strong  commitment
from all of us.
I  have  not  attempted  to propose  a specific  fiscal  policy  prescrip-
tion  for inflation  but instead  have  tried to give  an  overview  of how
fiscal policy works in affecting the level of economic activity.
There  are  numerous  fiscal  policy proposals in addition to the ones
I  have  mentioned,  but  I  believe  the record  indicates  that  present
fiscal  policies  are  just  now  moving  us  into  an  inflation-fighting
posture.  We  can,  and  should,  stand ready to  provide targeted  relief
to  the  poor  and  the unemployed  during the inevitable  recessionary
period.  But that relief must not provide a general economic stimulus.
I  am  one  who  believes  that the only ultimate remedy for inflation
is  recession.  Because  we  have  allowed  conditions  to become  so  bad
we  must  not  expect  to  correct  the  economy  overnight.  I  wish  I
could  end  on  a  more  positive  note but maybe  the failure  to admit
that some medicine must taste bad is what got us into this mess.
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